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On 2 April, ﬁghting erupted at the ‘line of contact’ between Azerbaijan and the self-declared
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which has been the subject of a prolonged stand-oﬀ between
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Richard Giragosian writes that despite an agreement on 5 April to halt
the conﬂict, sporadic clashes have continued. He argues that it will now be extremely diﬃcult to
deescalate the situation and that the latest violence could further strengthen Russia’s inﬂuence in
the region.
In the most serious escalation of ﬁghting in over two decades, the formerly “frozen” conﬂict of
Nagorno-Karabakh has quickly erupted into open warfare, presenting Russia with a fresh opportunity to further
consolidate its power and inﬂuence in the region.
Early on 2 April, Azerbaijani forces launched a coordinated oﬀensive targeting three diﬀerent fronts along the
Nagorno-Karabakh “line of contact” separating Karabakh from Azerbaijan. As the ﬁghting rapidly escalated, the
fragile but largely observed ceaseﬁre that was in eﬀect for some twenty-one years was the ﬁrst notable casualty. By
the time the ﬁghting subsided on the fourth day of combat, well over 100 were dead or wounded on all sides.
But even with a subsequent 5 April agreement reached in Moscow to halt the ﬁghting, a series of sporadic
exchanges of ﬁre reaﬃrmed the volatility and the vulnerability of the situation. In fact, even with the cease in ﬁring,
there is still no clear return to the prior ceaseﬁre.
Daunting diplomacy
The Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict, which can trace its roots as far back as before the collapse of the Soviet Union, has
long stood out as one of the world’s more daunting diplomatic challenges. And the unresolved nature of the conﬂict
has been regularly reaﬃrmed with a steady escalation in tension and exchanges of ﬁre that have left several dead
and wounded nearly each month in recent years.
On one side stands the ethnic Armenians of Karabakh, who seceded from Azerbaijan in the waning days of
Gorbachev’s Soviet Union and subsequently declared themselves “independent”, strongly pursuing the principle of
self-determination. But Azerbaijan, which lost a war in the early 1990s over Karabakh, rejects the principle of self-
determination, accepting only the opposing principle of territorial integrity.
Against this backdrop, the future status of the self-declared independent Karabakh enclave has become the subject
of a unique brand of tri-partite diplomacy, mediated and co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States. This
rather odd and surprising diplomatic triad is known as the “Minsk Group”, which is an entity within the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), through which the mediators have long struggled to “square the
circle” of diplomatic divergence. There has been little to show for their eﬀorts beyond a series of peace talks that
have been weakened by a pronounced lack of political will. This virtual deadlock in diplomacy has resulted in an
outcome that is well short of a peace process and further lacking in terms of promise or progress.
Azerbaijan’s tipping point
As the loser in this conﬂict, Azerbaijan has become increasingly frustrated with the lack of any tangible results to
date from the peace talks. This has fostered a new, more dangerous situation where Azerbaijani patience in
diplomacy has reached a “tipping point”, with a preference for force of arms coming to prominence instead.
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And no matter what the immediate cause or trigger, that tipping point was most evidently breached in Azerbaijan’s
launch of combat operations on 2 April. While the eruption of clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh was neither new nor
surprising, given a broader trend of increasingly deadly ﬁghting over the last several years, this particular round of
ﬁghting was diﬀerent, for two main reasons.
First, the recent ﬁghting was much more than a border skirmish. Rather, it was an intensive oﬀensive campaign that
opened as a well-coordinated assault. It exceeded all prior attacks in both scale and scope, marked by the most
serious combat since a ceaseﬁre was ﬁrst reached in May 1994.
Map of the contested territories in Nagorno-Karabakh. Source: Regional Studies Centre. 
A second key diﬀerence was that, for the ﬁrst time, the military campaign was based on a new Azerbaijani strategy
aimed at seizing and securing control of territory. This new strategy was also bolstered by a serious improvement in
Azerbaijan’s military capabilities, with demonstrable gains in operational coordination and in the application of
“combined arms” involving the use of heavier weapons, such as artillery, armored units, and combat helicopters.
But after only a few hours on the opening day of this campaign, the eﬃcacy of the Azerbaijani combined arms
operation quickly declined in the face of a counter-attack by Karabakh defenders that better utilised the topography
and terrain. Militarily, Azerbaijan’s reliance on a rapid “blitzkrieg” oﬀensive operation was further impeded by the
combination of well-fortiﬁed defensive positions and a daunting mountainous environment. By the third day of the
ﬁghting, the situation had stabilised, with both sides forced back to their original positions and nearly all lost territory
regained. Overall, the ﬁnal outcome of the four-day military campaign reﬂected the limits and the nature of warfare in
Nagorno-Karabakh, mirroring the impediments of World War I-period trench warfare.
Reinforcing Russia’s inﬂuence
Despite the inconclusive nature of the conﬂict, the aﬀair now holds wider implications. By brokering a suspension in
ﬁghting, Moscow was able to demonstrate that only a unilateral Russian-led diplomatic initiative could successfully
stabilise the situation on the ground. Although nominally implemented through the OSCE Minsk Group format, the
Russian eﬀort at “shuttle diplomacy” reaﬃrmed and reinforced the local perception that Russian involvement is
essential, largely to the diplomatic detriment of the two other Minsk Group co-chairs, France and the United States.
And given the inherent fragility of the existing ceaseﬁre agreement, the Karabakh conﬂict may become even more of
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an instrument for Moscow to enhance its power and inﬂuence, perhaps with a renewed bid to deploy Russian
peacekeepers, which Russia has been tempted to consider in the past. Such Russian gains from this conﬂict are not
new, and are reﬂected by Russia’s position as the primary arms provider to both Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Moreover, as the West holds little leverage over Azerbaijan and in light of the lack of political will to return to the
negotiations, Baku also views Moscow as the key to any change in what it sees as an unacceptable “status quo”.
And there is some merit in this view, as Russia is the only actor to beneﬁt from the escalation and is well-positioned
to exploit the conﬂict to further deepen its power and inﬂuence in the region.
No deterrence
The ﬁghting also highlighted the absence of any real deterrence to prevent or at least pressure any side from
launching military operations. Although there are no real strategic advantages for the Armenian and Karabakh sides
from oﬀensive operations, the lack of a deterrent to discourage Azerbaijan is exacerbated by the limited leverage the
West has over the country, as well as Russia’s position as Azerbaijan’s main source of modern weapon systems.
Beyond Russia, however, the outbreak of warfare has also altered the calculus of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations. More
speciﬁcally, over the past few months, Azerbaijan has weathered a precarious position of being forced to navigate
the larger crisis between Turkey and Russia. Yet with the onset of combat operations, Baku was able to regain the
initiative, retaking control of Ankara’s regional agenda and garnering blanket Turkish support.
At its core, it seems unlikely that anyone except the parties to the conﬂict themselves can climb down and step back
from the brink. A return to normal aﬀairs and a real de-escalation seems unlikely, especially as the conﬂict is now
deﬁned by a “new normal”, ensuring that it is virtually impossible to return to the earlier status quo. And such a bleak
outlook is due in large part to the fact that despite its “mediation”, Moscow has made it clear that it intends to
continue to provide arms to combatants on all sides, adding further fuel to a now dangerously combustible situation.
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